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THE PROGRESS OF EVOLUTION[1]

THE progress of evolution has various meanings. Hence it is necessary to define the subject proposed for consideration. Progress, first, may denote the spread of evolutionary doctrine. But this is patent, so that discussion is not required. Or it may mean the development of biological theory. In regard to this we need remember only that progress has of late been making, since progress here, contrary to the earlier belief, has proven indispensable. The fact of evolution is established. The form, the law, the process of evolution, and the forces at work therein, remain subjects of eager technical debate. Or, thirdly, progress might refer to the readjustment of principles occasioned by the acceptance of evolution. This phase of the matter lies more fully within the philosophical field; still it is not the one now suggested for discussion. Our subject proper may be termed the noetic of evolution, the discussion of the concepts and principles implied by evolution, and on which it is based. What progress has been made in respect of these? What was needed? How much has been gained? What remains to be accomplished? Along with these questions, I shall also recall certain phases of the history of opinion.

1. I begin with a negative statement of progress which may excite dissent: a just estimate has not yet been reached of the origin of evolutionary theory. It is common to date the beginning from Darwin. But genetic views were fundamental in nineteenth-century thinking before Darwin announced, in part before he had conceived, "The Origin of Species." Among naturalists a notable minority had been groping their way toward a theory of descent. Spencer, at the mid-century, was advancing from sociology, biology, and psychology, to his cosmical doctrine. Prior to both Darwin and Spencer many of the *Geisteswissenschaften* had felt the influence of idealistic evolution, or had of themselves approached their problems

[1] Read before the American Philosophical Association, Harvard University, December 28, 1911.

by the genetic line of attack. Great as Darwinism was—in itself and through its effects—it may be questioned whether part of its success was not due to the preparation previously made for evolutionary conclusions. This question has special pertinence in regard to the influence of evolution beyond the limits of biology. Concerning this broader field there has been, and there persists, some confusion of opinion. Here, too, Darwin's work has been the greatest single force. But it has not been the only force, or the earliest, or the creative force in the temporal sense of the term. More often—in the phrase of a recent writer[2]—it has furnished "vast reinforcement" to tendencies already existing.

2. Progress has been made in distinguishing phenomenal from transcendent evolution. Though Darwinism was not the sole cause of the intellectual revolution of the mid-century, it was the principal cause. The movement thus involved a scientific theory. And as we look back to the discussions of the sixties, how few there then were who distinguished between scientific results and transcendent implications. Primarily the issue lay between rival theories of organic life: Are species fixed in nature, or are they mutable, produced by gradual process? But this issue was phrased in terms which combined science and theology: Have species been created once for all, or are they mutable and explicable by descent? The question of phenomenal fact and law was crossed with a transcendent problem.

Related, of course, these questions are. And under the conditions of thought fifty years ago it was inevitable that they should be united. Nevertheless the consequences were disastrous. In regard to them, and concerning a number of kindred questions, the result was extreme confusion. The light engendered by the controversy was small, the heat in inverse ratio. Now, however, we marvel less at the clash of opposing doctrines and the emotional disturbance than at the tacit assumptions which were fundamental to the whole debate. Among these the fallacy under consideration took a prominent place. Neither orthodox nor revolutionary distinguished between phenomenal truths and ultimate interpretations.

From this fallacy later thought is happily delivered. At least, in this connection progress has been making in the sphere of ethics and theology. Whether the gain is equal in philosophy proper appears more doubtful. Fact and notion, law and ultimate principle, differ, whatever the instrument of transcendent thought may be—whether faith or seasoned speculation. But concerning evolution the distinction has been made more clear in the former than in the latter case. Our scientific brethren we can hardly hold re-

[2] Waggett, "Darwin and Modern Science," page 480.

sponsible for the confusion—or popular reflection. Have philosophical thinkers always been clear on the point themselves? Have they contributed in due measure to the general enlightenment?

3. Evolution and the sciences. The problem just suggested has various ramifications. Scientific evolution and philosophical evolution touch—and differ. Hence arise questions in the logic of science—on the other hand, also, questions of metaphysical conclusion. Our primary concern is with the problems of the former class, among which the subject of method is first and prominent.

At the end of the "Origin of Species," Darwin predicted the application of evolution to psychology and anthropology. This prophecy, as all are aware, has been amply fulfilled. The mental sciences like the organic, sociology and ethics as well as psychology proper, have felt the stimulus of genetic ideas; not, however, without doubtful transfers of method and explanatory principle from one science to another, or from the sciences of one group to a group essentially diverse. Biological evolution has wrought out—Darwin, cautious technician that he is, concludes—"the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation." The struggle for existence determines organic evolution: mental evolution and its sub-varieties—social, ethical, artistic, literary, religious—the extremists urge, must follow the same law.

Here progress has been forced by the continuing inquiry. The phenomena themselves have compelled revision of the categories chosen to explain them. Two examples may be cited in illustration. In moral evolution, as speedily appeared, the law of struggle in its primary form is a doubtful application. It would tend, for one thing, to eliminate rather than to conserve the superior individual. Therefore it was referred to the survival of the group, and competition was interpreted as tribal instead of individual. Later the problem of heredity grew pressing, and in particular the problem of mental inheritance. Here the emphasis has recently been placed on the importance of the social environment, and a return has been made to the doctrine of social heredity—a position, I venture to think, which we should never have abandoned.

Progress then has been making at this point also. Is it, however, complete? Is it so great as is vitally needed for the independent prosperity of the sciences of the mental group? An affirmative answer would be of questionable validity. Undoubtedly the climax has been passed. No longer—or, at least, more rarely—do we explain all things, from theology to summer novels, by natural selection. But biological psychology continues fairly prevalent. And one has even heard echoes of a similar spirit in recent developments of philosophy itself!

4. The presuppositions of evolution: that is, the presuppositions of a noetical kind, the concepts and principles assumed by evolution and on which it depends. Such are present, even in the scientific form of the doctrine, in evolution as a theory of descent. Still more are they present and determinant when the consequences of organic evolution are drawn, when its conclusions are brought to bear upon broader problems, when its methods are applied in other departments of thought. If the matter itself admitted of uncertainty, the doubt might be dispelled by a glance at recent history. Fifty years ago men confused scientific evolution and its transcendent implications. For the most part, also, they overlooked the bases on which their own arguments rested. Consider, *e. g.*, the famous meeting of the British Association at Oxford in 1860. In the discussion between Wilberforce and Huxley the honors lay with the scientific thinker. In ethics, as in science, the biologist showed superior to the bishop. In epistemology, however, were not both at fault? For them, as for most thinkers of the time, the debatable issue was the question of fact: Is man descended from some animal form? The corollaries of the fact, they felt, needed no debate: If man is so descended, man is man no longer. For the underlying notions which condition this conclusion were left out of account; or they were deemed of little moment. Change and becoming, origin and nature, genesis and value—how many thought of these ancient problems as fundamental to nineteenth-century reflection? Yet nothing is clearer, if the matter is thought through to the end, nothing more certain, than that such concepts underlie the whole body of genetic doctrine.

If now we ask what progress has in this respect been made, the answer is complex. In certain ways the advance has been considerable. For the pressure of the questions forced by evolution on the world compelled attention also to their underlying bases. I do not mean to say that this attentive thought has always realized its own procedure. That is rarely true in the history of such movements. More often there is a mingling of methods—reflective thinking, conscious of its own nature and aims, goes hand in hand, or side by side, with processes which may best be described as processes of trial and error, practical attempts at partial readjustment adapted to the needs of given cases. Such processes have in special measure been characteristic of our time. We could not become philosophers at a bound. Or rather, we have philosophized in the happy belief that naught of metaphysics was mingled with our thinking. The origin of species, the descent of man, the genesis of conscience, political, social, religious development—in measure we have thought through, or worked through, or "muddled through" our problems. And though we often knew it not, we have been busy the while with these

other cruces—origin, nature, worth, and their relations—for they were inwrought in the tissue of our reflective task.

Progress has been most pronounced in the field of the mental sciences. A letter of Henry Sedgwick, dated in the middle eighties, well expresses the change from the earlier point of view. Thinking of the non-moral and the moral stages of evolution, Sedgwick wrote: "I can not feel any doubt as to the *historic fact* of the time-relation of the two. . . . But I do not think that the determination of this historical question settles the relation between the two: the fundamental question still remains open whether what is later in time is to be understood by contemplating what went before it, . . . or whether the process of cosmical or of human development is not of such a kind that the significance of the earlier stages is only revealed when we look forward to their end. This, I think, is the deepest question of philosophy in the present stage of thought." The conclusion suggested by the lamented Sidgwick was reached by many thinkers in the closing decades of the century gone, but not by all. On questions of such import scholars will differ, even when the issues have been made clear, and when, so far as may be, they have been thought through. Above all, these causes of divergence produce their maximum effect in ages which, like our own, have felt the spell of great discoveries. But if, in the nature of the case, progress could not be complete, has it been adequate? I fear the answer must be given in the negative. Indeed, if I mistake not, there has been of late considerable reaction toward the earlier and the cruder point of view. Current accounts of evolution and its influence not merely proclaim the universal potency of the genetic method, they appear to imply that no other estimate is possible. At times this conclusion is urged as the unassailable outcome of nineteenth-century reflection. It should rather be termed the position of the mid-century, or of the first decades after the mid-century was passed. For it ignores the progress which the later years have brought.

It is necessary in conclusion to guard against a possible misunderstanding. The thesis that progress has been less than adequate does not imply agreement with venturesome essays of a contrary type. If certain forms of genetic theory ignore their own noetic problems, some philosophers of evolution attack these questions in a spirit of surprising confidence. The question may be raised whether Bergson himself should not be included in the latter class. Mind, Bergson defends in the evolutionary process, and other important interests. But what of the method of defense? It is incisive, it is illuminating, the argument is phrased in a marvelous style, the doctrine is one of those works of genius which get us forward by its stimulating influence, whether or not it can in the end be accepted as true. Is there,

however, sufficient evidence for the conclusions reached? This at least is the doubt which recurs to some of us who welcome many of these conclusions. In the case of other systems the foundations are certainly too weak to support the constructions which are reared upon them. Therefore systems of this type also represent imperfect progress. For they are unstable, and, being unstable, they fail to realize their legitimate aims. In sum the noetic cruces suggested by evolution can not reasonably be ignored. Neither, on the other hand, are they solvable at a stroke.

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THE FEELING OF OUGHTNESS: ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS

THIS JOURNAL having been kind enough to review[1] with some sympathy a paper of mine, which, as Professor Leuba phrased it, was intended to "clear much of the ground surrounding one of the fundamental problems of the psychology of ethics," I venture to submit to American men of science the conclusions of a larger inquiry which is to appear this year in Binet's *Année psychologique.*

The problem is that of the psychological conditions of this specific and well-known state of mind which a subject expresses when he says: "I am conscious that I ought." In a paper[2] of 1897, Professor Leuba has called it "the feeling of oughtness." I shall use the term, although it seems to me that the latest researches on the psychology of *feelings* tend to confine this word to affective states, where the consciousness is necessarily either agreeable or painful. Writing in French, I have used the expression *la conscience de devoir* or *l'obligation de conscience.*

The feeling of oughtness is not always connected with the impression of moral goodness. I have found it very often in introspections gathered during experiments on judgment and ideation, and was thus put on the way of an experimental study of this feeling such as, if I am not mistaken, has never been conducted before.

The first results concerning this feeling of oughtness in the laboratory experiments are the following:

1. It is the apperception of an internal conflict between two tend-

[1] Vol. VIII., page 361.

[2] "The Psychophysiology of the Moral Imperative," *Amer. Journal of Psychology,* Vol. VIII., No. 4.

encies, one of which has its origin in some definite *orders* (French *consigne;* German *Aufgabe*) given to the subject as to a sentry.

2. These orders give birth only to a tendency if they be *accepted* by the subject. This acceptance implies, as its condition, a peculiar relation between the subject and the inquirer. From the standpoint of the subject this relation may be roughly described as an affective state—a combination of love and fear and admiration which gives to the experimenter prestige and authority in the eyes of the subject.

These being the results of a first investigation, the question arises: What are the tendencies of every-day life which can be assimilated to the tendency originating from *orders?* What are the tendencies which, if they meet with opposition, shall give rise to the feeling of oughtness? Habit, social custom and example, instinct have been asserted by several schools to be the fountain of moral obligation. I think it can be shown that none of them is, if considered alone, the source of any obligation whatever. Habit (of church going, *e. g.*) enforces the feeling of oughtness; it does not create it. Social custom has certainly in every one of us a binding force; but it does not act in this way through habits nor through the ideo-motor power of example. It is felt as an obligation, because there are, at its origin, positive *orders* given by respected authorities to affectively disposed subjects: in other terms, because the circumstances are exactly the same as in the laboratory experiments alluded to.

If, in speaking of instincts, we first think of animal life, is it not curious that the symptoms, which might be interpreted as proving the presence of a feeling of oughtness in animals, are to be found in dogs to whom *orders* are given in general terms? Ought we perhaps to consider our domestic animals as Aristotle considered the slave: if they be not apt to form general judgments, they might be, nevertheless, capable of receiving them?

The orders given in general terms to the psychological subject as to the soldier have not only the same characteristics as the ancestral *taboo* to which the sociological school gives such a great place in the explanation of moral ideas; they also answer exactly to the description which Kant gives of the moral law: categorical, imperative, but requiring some experience, if one is to see where they have to be applied in practical life. This resemblance is easy to account for. The *orders* are indeed a product of reason, if we think that reason has a part in every universal proposition, be it indicative or imperative. But we have no ground for invoking here a *pure* reason dictating a law to all intelligent beings, whether human or not. Kant says himself that his theory does not in the least account for

the practical effect of this purely rational law; the fact of obligation remains to him entirely unintelligible.[3]

If we say that the origin of obligation is to be found in an universal proposition formulated by a concrete person and accepted by another person, we shall understand the binding character of some *orders,* which to our intellectual judgment appear absurd. The obligatory character of the law of sacrifice, as it is felt by many Christians, is inconsistent with the rationalistic theory as well as with the sociological one: this law, taken universally, is anti-rational as well as anti-social. With our theory, if we have received the law from somebody whom we love and admire, this is sufficient to explain the hold it has on us.

Two questions are forced on our attention and require further examination: (1) How does the reason work in order to transform the "impression of good," given by a particular action, into a general judgment of value? (2) How is the affective relation, necessary to the acceptance of orders, originated? To this last problem so much may here be said: there is no ground to believe that prestige is always of social origin. Psycho-analysis shows a way in which biological and sociological values might be created apart from any social influence.

These few propositions may perhaps be of some interest even without the body of facts which in a longer article could be called upon to back them up. They are, as can be seen, purely psychological. Their ethical, pedagogical, and philosophical corollaries do not concern us here. When the causal relations, which we have set forth, shall be generally recognized, the various philosophies will have to reckon with them, and they will do so without difficulty. Some will welcome the contingent character of our moral obligations; others will be impressed with the great place our theory gives to the personality: to them the mystery of personality will soon seem as sacred and as adorable as did the mystery of the moral law.

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DISCUSSION

PROFESSOR DEWEY'S "BRIEF STUDIES IN REALISM"

IN the interesting "Studies in Realism," which Mr. Dewey has recently published,[1] he has done two things. In addition to presenting more fully than he had done before his own view of the

[3] "Grundlegung," 3d section, *sub fine.*

[1] This JOURNAL, Vol. VIII., pages 393 ff. and pages 546 ff.

nature of perception, he has criticized the doctrine of perception held by "epistemological" and "presentative" realists. It is this criticism of realism that I wish to examine in this paper.

The cardinal error Mr. Dewey finds in this realism is perhaps best summed up in these words: "Until the epistemological realists have seriously considered the main propositions of the pragmatic realists, viz., that knowing is something that happens to things in the natural course of their career, not the sudden introduction of a 'unique' and non-natural type of relation—that to a mind or consciousness—they are hardly in a position to discuss the second and derived pragmatic proposition that, in this natural continuity, things in becoming known undergo a specific and detectable qualitative change" (p. 554). The realists criticized are guilty, then, of believing that knowing is a sudden introduction of a "unique" and non-natural relation.

There are three adjectives in this charge, but I presume that only one of them has any dyslogistic significance. The suddenness of the introduction of any relation can hardly be objected to by any empiricist who sticks to his last. Nor can the recognition of the uniqueness of any relation be reasonably considered by Mr. Dewey as an anti-empirical procedure. He has himself recognized at least one unique relation and has given an excellent statement of what a unique relation is: "Here, if you please, is a unique relation of self and things, but it is unique, not in being wholly incomparable to all natural relations among events, but in the sense of being distinctive, or just the relation that it is" (p. 552). This sentence shows that the adjective that really is meant to count in Mr. Dewey's indictment is the adjective "non-natural."

Now why should the consciousness relation, which "epistemological" and "presentative" realists recognize, be considered non-natural? The answer seems to be that for them this relation is a relation *"to a mind."* A very cursory glance over the pages of Mr. Dewey's articles will show that the realists he is criticizing, whether "presentative" or "epistemological," are constantly represented as holding that the thing known in perception is in relation "to a knower" or "to consciousness." Every criticism he passes against these realists presupposes for its validity that these realists are committed to the doctrine that there is a non-natural "mind" or "consciousness" or "knower," and that anything in order to get known must get into a non-natural relation to this non-natural term. It is possible that these criticisms could be stated in other forms which should leave out of account this presupposition, so thorough-going in the form in which Mr. Dewey has stated them, but what the criticisms would then be would largely be a matter of conjecture. As the

criticisms now stand they have direct pertinence only to some type of non-naturalistic realism which is based on the recognition of "mind" as an indispensable "knower" in every perception.

Relation to a mind or consciousness or knower! This is a thesis which some years ago was quite generally supported, and among realists even now Messrs. Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore still maintain this thesis. But most of the American thinkers, whom the American Philosophical Association's "Committee on Definitions" would class as "epistemologically monistic realists," have been as outspoken against this thesis as Mr. Dewey himself. For instance, Mr. Woodbridge and the contributors to the "First Program and Platform of Six Realists" have made it fundamental to their respective realisms that consciousness is a relation *between* things and not a term of a relation or a relation of things to mind.

Now Mr. Dewey has, in the commendable way so characteristic of him, made his criticisms as impersonal as possible. With two or three exceptions he has named no names; but he has made it, nevertheless, quite obvious that the "epistemological" and "presentative" realists he has in mind are those whose views are similar to Mr. Perry's. His reference to Mr. Perry's phrase, "ego-centric predicament,"[2] near the beginning of his second paper, seems to be a clear indication of his meaning, so far as "epistemological" realism is concerned. As regards "presentative" realism his position is made unmistakable. "Many realists . . . have treated the cases of seen light, doubled imagery, as perception in a way that ascribes to perception an inherent cognitive status. They have treated the perceptions as *cases of knowledge,* instead of as simply natural events having, in themselves (apart from a *use* that may be made of them), no more knowledge status or worth than, say, a shower or a fever. What I intend to show is that if 'perceptions' are regarded as cases of knowledge, the gate is opened to the idealistic interpretation. The physical explanation holds of them as long as they are regarded simply as natural events—a doctrine I shall call naïve realism; it does not hold of them considered as cases of knowledge—the view I call presentative realism" (p. 395). All epistemologically monistic realism, thus, is explicitly brought within the scope of his criticism.

Now how does Mr. Dewey show that when perceptions are regarded as cases of knowledge the gate is opened to the idealistic interpretation? After stating his own "naïve" realistic position he says: "But suppose that the realist accepts the traditionary psychology according to which every event in the way of a perception is also a case of knowing something. Is the way out now so simple?

[2] Of the bearing of which on the realistic position I have written elsewhere, *Philosophical Review,* Vol. XXI., pages 351 ff.

In the case of the doubled fingers or the seen light, the thing known in perception contrasts with the physical source and cause of the knowledge. There *is* a numerical duplicity. Moreover, the thing known in perception is *in relation to a knower,* while the physical cause is not as such *in relation to a knower.* Is not the most plausible account of the difference between the physical cause of the perceptive knowledge and what the latter presents precisely this latter difference—namely, *presentation to a knower?* If perception is a case of knowing, it must be a case of knowing the star; but since the 'real' star is not known in the perception, the knowledge relation must somehow have changed the 'object' into a 'content.' *Thus* when the realist conceives the perceptual occurrence as a case of knowledge *or of presentation to a mind or knower,* he lets the nose of the idealist camel into the tent. He has not great cause for surprise when the camel comes in—and devours the tent'' (pp. 395–6; most of the italics mine).

It is as clear as anything can be that here the gate is opened to the idealistic interpretation by the introduction of the phrases and clauses I have italicized. Once deny that a case of knowledge is a presentation of the thing known to a ''mind'' or ''knower,'' and the proof that an idealistic interpretation is involved in the treatment of perceptions as cases of knowledge loses all cogency. But this is just the denial that is made by many realists who still regard perceptions as cases of knowledge. These realists, however, in so regarding perceptions are ''presentative'' realists according to Mr. Dewey's definition. In other words, Mr. Dewey's proof of the essentially idealistic character of ''presentative'' realism requires two premises. One is that perceptions are cases of knowlege, and the other is that perceptive knowledge is presentation to a ''knower.'' Without the latter premise the proof halts, and Mr. Dewey must do without this premise if he is to represent the position of these realists correctly. Mr. Dewey's proof then leaves untouched the question whether these realists have given ground for the idealists' neglect of the physical explanation given by realists of such cases as doubled imagery (p. 395).

Now everything that is further urged in these two articles against ''presentative'' and ''epistemological'' realism assumes that all the advocates of this realism believe perception to be a presentation of objects ''to a mind.'' Hence the whole argument is void as against these realists who, while being ''presentative'' and ''epistemological,'' deny the existence of a ''mind'' to which objects are presented. It is quite possible, as I have already suggested, that some of the reasons urged against this type of realism can be restated so as to bear against it, but it is evident that in the form in which they have

been stated by Mr. Dewey they are beside the mark, if the mark is this type of realism.[3]

But there is one specification of the charge against "presentative" realism which it is possible here to examine without regard to the fact that it is implicated in the general misunderstanding already alluded to. Mr. Dewey says that if "presentative" realism be true the physical conditions which cause perception ought to be perceived along with other objects. "In the case of the seen light, reference to the velocity of light is quite adequate to account for its occurrence in its time and space difference from the star. But viewed as a case of what is known (on the supposition that perception is a case of knowledge), reference to it only increases the contrast between the real object and the object known in perception. For, being just as much a part of the object that causes the perception as is the star itself, it (the velocity of light) *ought* to be part of what is known in the perception, while it is not. Since the velocity of light is a constituent element in the star, it should be known in the perception; since it is not so known, reference to it only increases the discrepancy between the object of the perception—the seen light—and the real, astronomical star. The same is true of any physical conditions that might be referred to: *The very things that, from the standpoint of perception as a natural event, are conditions that account for its happening are, from the standpoint of perception as a case of knowledge, part of the object that ought to be known but is not*" (pp. 396–7).

The simplest way to answer this criticism is to challenge the statement. Why *ought* anything to be perceived that is not perceived? Either we have an empiricist theory of perception or we have an apriorist theory. Apriorism can, from its own presuppositions, lay down the law as to what ought to be. The genuine empiricist may also be concerned with what ought to be, but, in matters theoretical, what ought to be is for him only what he is led by experience to expect. If these expectations are not realized, he does not decline to accept what comes instead; he merely tries next time not to cherish such vain expectations. Now our past experience does

[3] The fact that such an acute thinker as Mr. Dewey can criticize an adverse view without realizing that he is thoroughly misapprehending it should make him more sympathetic with the failure of the critics of instrumentalism in understanding its presuppositions. It may also be suggested that perhaps one reason for Mr. Dewey's misunderstanding questions asked of him by a realist, questions that concern his view of consciousness, is that Mr. Dewey misunderstands the questioner's view of consciousness and is thus led to impute to the questioner an imputation to Mr. Dewey of a view which the latter has first erroneously imputed to the questioner. (See Mr. Dewey's "Reply," this JOURNAL, Vol. IX., pages 19 ff.)

not justify us in saying that whenever anything is perceived the physical conditions which give rise to our perception of it are all perceived. If then we persist in saying that nevertheless they *ought* to be perceived, this "ought" is evidently not an "ought" of empirically warranted expectation, but an "ought" of *a priori* legislation. It is a bit of sheer dogmatism, of licentious intellectualism; and the use of such an "ought" by an avowed opponent of dogmatism and intellectualism for the purpose of demolishing an empirical realism comes as a startling surprise, not unrelieved by a touch of humor.

"Presentative" realists who regard consciousness as a selective relation among things, a relation unique in the sense of being the distinctive relation it is and comparable to other natural relations,[4] have in this conception of consciousness a means of explaining why the physical conditions of perception as a case of knowledge are not themselves perceived. This explanation consists in showing that what has to be explained is an instance of a general characteristic of selective relations. This characteristic is exemplified when the chisel of the sculptor, though it is the physical condition of the marble's assuming a similitude to the model, does not itself enter into the relation of similarity with statue and model. Suppose, for another instance, that my room-mate at college invites me to spend the holidays at his home and that there I meet his sister whom I subsequently marry. When I thus enter into the matrimonial relation with the girl of my choice, must she and I include her brother in the family constituted by our marriage, because forsooth he was the condition of our coming to know and love and wed each other? Must we likewise marry the clergyman who officiated at the ceremony, and also marry the marriage-license which authorized it, because they too are the conditions of the marriage? What a monstrously redundant polygamy such an "ought" requires every bride and groom to commit! It seems the most "natural" thing in the world that new relations should arise and sometimes arise suddenly, and yet that the conditions, physical and otherwise, which brought about these relationships should not be included in the specific relational complexes produced by them. Why should we deny to the consciousness relation a similar privilege of obtaining among just the terms its conditions see fit to assign to it, without intruding ourselves upon it with the arbitrary demand that it should be more catholic in its terms than it naturally is?

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[4] "'Experience and its Inner Duplicity,' this JOURNAL, Vol. VI., page 232: "In answering this question I beg the reader not to allow the term 'togetherness' as I have employed it to prejudice him. Like every general term, it emphasizes common features and slurs over peculiar features."

SOCIETIES

THE TWELFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE WESTERN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

THE Twelfth Annual Meeting of the Western Philosophical Association was held at the University of Chicago, April 5 and 6, 1912. In pursuance of the plan adopted by the executive committee, the morning and afternoon sessions of the first day were devoted to papers on ethics and the discussion of ethical problems. The special topic of the afternoon was "The Teaching of Ethics." The discussion of this topic, led by F. C. Sharp, J. H. Tufts, and J. W. Hudson, was lively and profitable. In the evening the visiting members were guests of the local members at a delightful dinner given at the Quadrangle Club. At the session immediately following, the President's address was given by A. W. Moore upon "Bergson and Pragmatism." The day was closed by a smoker where the usual good-fellowship prevailed.

The morning of the second day was given to a joint session with the Western Psychological Association, at which five papers were read and discussed. At the business meeting, which was held at the close of the afternoon session, reports were received from the Secretary and Treasurer, B. C. Ewer, showing a balance on hand of $82.85, and from the Acting Secretary, H. W. Wright, showing an expenditure of $9.58 for printing, postage, etc. E. B. Crooks, V. A. C. Henmon, H. M. Kallen, and G. T. Kirn were elected to membership in the Association. Officers for the coming year were elected as follows: *President,* J. E. Boodin; *Vice-president,* B. H. Bode; *Secretary and Treasurer,* H. W. Wright; *Executive Committee,* A. W. Moore, A. K. Rogers, G. A. Tawney, W. K. Wright. The place and time of the next meeting were left to the decision of the Executive Committee.

The following are abstracts of papers read at this meeting:

The Genesis and Function of the Ethical Ideal: G. T. KIRN.

The ethical ideals are the product of the natural life which proceeds to organize experience.

Human life begins with instincts, and if ever more than an instinctive life is to appear the instincts must be redirected by the rational life.

In the growth of the ethical ideal there is a prelogical stage, for ethical ideals as well as concepts are formed before we become conscious of the process. They are largely the bequest of social heredity, and are enforced by social authority. But what at first is done unconsciously will in time be done under the direction of consciousness.

An instinctive act has consequences which are unsatisfactory and

the unsatisfactory results tend to inhibit the instinct. After a number of repetitions the "idea" of unpleasant future consequences will inhibit present impulses to action. The action of the moment is now organized with reference to life as a whole.

Society also makes the contribution, for the actions of one person have consequences for another. The painful response of the other has an inhibitive effect upon the agent; and the impulse of the moment is organized in a larger whole, which is society. In all cases the ideals crystallize out of experience and determine the direction a personality takes in the realization of itself.

Even the earlier prophets of Israel wrote history in order to trace the relation between conduct and consequences. Thus they ascertained the will of their God. The authority which at first is found in society is afterwards turned over to reason which instinctively urges that every intention, or volition, be consistent and in harmony with the experience already organized.

The Essentials of a First Course in Ethics: GREGORY D. WALCOTT.

A first course in ethics should give college students a fairly adequate survey of the field of ethical discussion and present a fairly consistent programme of procedure when face to face with actual ethical problems. The former result is gained by an epitomized history of philosophy, with emphasis upon the ethical contributions of the more important thinkers as presented in their own works; the latter, by a constructive discussion of a half dozen main topics, viz., "The Method of Ethics," which should be scientific against a general evolutionary background; "The Field of Ethics," where ethics is considered in relation to other subjects, especially sociology, from which it is practically differentiated by the altruistic motive; "The Different Planes of Ethical Living," which result, in part, in consequence of the opposition between the individual consciousness and the social consciousness; "The Criteria of Moral Progress," in connection with social progress evidenced by increasing social complexity and social control; "The Moral Ideal," which has both physical and psychical elements; and "The Realization of the Ideal," considered with reference to both an ideal and the actual environment. College students are a variable factor in the community and form a distinct class. They need to realize that their contribution to the social welfare will be in proportion to their affiliation with the larger group, but not complete submergence in it.

The New Individualism: JAMES H. TUFTS.

The new individualism defended by Professor Fite in his recent volume, "Individualism," takes as its point of departure the distinction between a mechanical and a conscious process, and proposes as

ethical standard, "To each according to his intelligence." The paper aims to examine how far the distinction referred to is consistently carried through, and whether the author's conceptions of the individual and society involve survivals of the mechanical point of view. As regards the criterion proposed, the question is discussed whether duty to another is adequately met by treating him according to his actual intelligence, or whether there is a duty to raise his intelligence.

The Introductory Course in Ethics: F. C. SHARP.

On account of its importance for the guidance of life, the course in elementary ethics should be accessible to the largest possible number of students. For this reason it should be free from prerequisites and should not ordinarily extend beyond the limits of a single semester. For the same reason, if a semester in theory and a semester in applied ethics are offered, each course should be so planned that it can be taken independently of the other.

The method generally employed in the class room in this country seems to be the "pouring-in method," in one of its several forms. This does not even accomplish satisfactorily the narrow ends which it sets before itself, that of the apprehension and retention of the results of the observation and thought of others. What is far more important, it does little or nothing to develop either the power to observe and think or the habit of observing and thinking. The method now in vogue should therefore be replaced by the method of discovery, in which the members of the class are given problems to work out and the teacher supplies only so much of the necessary information as the students are unable to obtain by their own efforts. Since we all live in an ethical laboratory the introduction of this method into ethics is a comparatively simple matter. The teaching of introductory ethics through the study of the history of ethics will by no means accomplish the results obtainable by the method here recommended.

The Content and Method of the First College Course in Ethics: JAY WILLIAM HUDSON.

The founding and maintaining of a concrete, democratic society is not merely a political project; it is primarily an ethical undertaking for the sake of a very definite ethical ideal of human welfare. It is an undertaking which implies rational, self-conscious responsibility on the part of every real member of it. This, in turn, implies the self-conscious examination and evaluation of moral standards by every man and woman who have achieved democracy's rights and duties. Education for democracy, in contrast with education for less autonomous forms of society, means a new and cardinal emphasis upon a thorough education in all the technique of efficient moral re-

flection. There is only one course in which the future citizen can receive a direct and intensive training of this sort—the course in ethics. The content and method of the course must be modified in terms of this neglected fact.

College Ethics for Freshmen: BERNARD C. EWER.

Many college troubles are due in part to undergraduate ignorance of college ideals. There is need of a systematic course of study, in the curriculum of the freshman year, dealing with the various educational and social aspects of college life. Such a course would include consideration of the history of the American college, its purpose, the individual programme of study, departments and methods of study, grades and honors, honesty, educational interests outside the curriculum, health, athletics, fraternities, co-education, student government, college spirit and college honor, religious institutions, the relation of the college to the home and to the surrounding community, the choice of a vocation. It should afford training in study methods, and could be combined with work in various departments. The literature used should include books and magazine articles on the college, and also the best popular books on education, health, American social and political life, and biography. Such a course would impart seriousness to undergraduate purposes, and would help to establish a cordial understanding between students and faculty.

Bergson and Pragmatism:[1] A. W. MOORE.

A Psychological Definition of Religion: WILLIAM K. WRIGHT.

The definition defended was: "Religion is the endeavor to secure the conservatism of socially recognized values through specific actions that are believed to evoke some agency different from the ordinary ego of the individual, or from other merely human beings, and that imply a feeling of dependence upon this agency." The definition is subjective and empirical and covers all cases of what any individual of any religion would himself regard as a religious act, and differentiates religion from animism, magic, morals, ethics, esthetics, and science. It is practically useful as a preliminary step toward determining the objective function of religion in human society, which is found to be conservative and socializing. This function is so significant as to furnish a strong defense for the ontological validity of religion in the field of contemporary metaphysics.

Present Status of the Problem of the Relation between Mind and Matter: MAX MEYER.

Modern scientific progress is largely due to the fact that scientists have ceased to introduce ghosts as causes into the explanation of objective facts. Accordingly, we ought not to introduce ghosts, sub-

[1] To be published in full elsewhere.

jective states, into our explanations of animal behavior, as is quite commonly done by comparative psychologists who speak of satisfaction as stamping in paths of low resistance in the nervous system, unless a scientific advantage is to be gained by thus deviating from the approved method of science. No one, however, has ever shown any advantage to be thus gained. If by interaction this ghost theory of animal and human behavior is meant, then we certainly ought to prefer parallelism, that is, purely objective science. If, on the other hand, by parallelism is meant that corresponding subjective states and nervous processes are strictly simultaneous, then we ought simply to wait till the answer is given by proper observation, which may become possible in the future. The most urgent need of the present time is the establishment of definite correlates of specific mental functions and of specific nervous functions so that we may translate subjective descriptions of human life into objective terms for the benefit of a purely objective theory of human behavior.

The Two Theories of Consciousness in Bergson: E. B. McGILVARY.

In "Time and Free Will," duration and motion are mechanical syntheses; *i. e.*, there is neither duration nor motion, except for a conscious spectator and except in consciousness. "If consciousness is aware of anything more than positions, the reason is that it keeps the successive positions in mind and synthesizes them" (p. 111).

In the first chapter of "Matter and Memory," not only do objects exist independently of the consciousness which perceives them, but these objects have motion and activity of their own; "the truth is that movements of matter are very clear, regarded as images, and that there is no need to look in motion for anything more than we see in it" (pp. 9–10). So far is consciousness from being the agent whose synthetic activity gives motion to inert spatial things, that on the contrary, consciousness arises only when the independent motion of matter is partly suppressed in order to make way for the indeterminate action of our bodies.

According to the former view there is more in consciousness than in matter; there is motion in consciousness, which matter by itself does not have. According to the latter view there is less in consciousness than in matter; the motion that matter has in its own right is reduced to give play to freedom. Bergson oscillates in the latter part of "Matter and Memory" and in "Creative Evolution" between these two views. His behavior exemplifies in a beautiful manner his theory that every one carries all his past with him and that just so much of this past as is suited to the exigencies of the present moment becomes effective. When it is suitable to the exigencies of his philosophy to remember that matter has been proved

to be inert, he remembers that this proof has been given. When it is suitable that matter should be active, he remembers that matter has been proved to be active. The difficulty which the reader finds in his later view of matter is thus due to the fact that Bergson combines two radically inconsistent views.

The Mechanism of Social Conduct: G. H. MEAD.

The mechanism of social conduct is to be regarded from the standpoint of social behavior. The peculiar character of social behavior is found in the gesture which influences other forms in acts involving members of a group. These gestures are the first overt indications of the response of another individual who forms the answering gesture. Within this field of the conversation of gestures lies social behavior. The social object or percept may be defined as the gestures which lead to a social act when it is sensed by another form, and arouses in that form the imagery of its answering gesture and the consequences of this response. This involves as yet only responses to social objects in the experience of an animal, but no consciousness of a self. This is presumably not present in the consciousness of animals lower than man nor in that of very young children. It is a growth in consciousness. The phase of social behavior which seems to give the mechanism for the formation of a self, is found in the human animal's ability to stimulate himself socially, largely through vocal gesture, as he stimulates others, and to respond to this gesture as he would to the vocal gesture of another. A self is in these terms one's own response to one's own social stimulation. One is able to carry on a conversation with one's self and one carries it on with others. This "me"—the empirical ego of psychology—arises only over against the consciousness of other selves and gains its importance through its function of rehearsing inhibited social actions in their relation to each other, in the reflective preparation for conduct involving interaction with other individuals of a group.

The Paradoxes of Pragmatism: B. H. BODE.

The paradoxes of pragmatism have their origin in the fact that certain of its doctrines are interpreted from different and incompatible standpoints. Such difficulties as arise from the appeal to immediate experience, from the changes that objects undergo in becoming known, and from the influence of the organism upon the character of our experiences, may be removed if we avoid the confusion of standpoints. The appeal to immediate experience is at the bottom a repudiation of the unknowable, to which other philosophies are bound to have recourse in order to give a consistent account of the nature of the truth-relation. The pragmatic account avoids this

result, and it is able to establish an intimate connection between the origin of hypothesis and the process by which it is verified. The apparent impossibility of attaining true knowledge of the past, if knowledge involves a change in things, ceases to be formidable if we do not construe the relation of organism and environment, and of past and present, in a mechanical fashion. Once we give up the attempt to cut off the past from the present and to make of knowing a process in which things are passively registered, the pragmatic explanation becomes straightforward and natural.

The Interpretation of Reality: H. W. WRIGHT.

Rationalism, whether it takes the form of naturalism or of intellectualism, is unable to interpret a reality which is undergoing genuine evolution. Naturalism attempts to interpret the real universe in terms of facts and forces whose modes of action are already fixed and predetermined, and hence leaves no opportunity for the occurrence of the really new, in fact, no possibility of evolution itself. Intellectualism, on the other hand, converts the legitimate demands of human thought for consistency and coherence of ideas into a test of reality, and, finding the actual world neither unified nor self-consistent, rejects it as illusory and regards the temporal process of change which we directly experience as mere appearance, and evolution itself as unreal. Neither is feeling nor any form of sensuous intuition adequate to the interpretation of real evolution. To which of our capacities shall we look then? Assuredly, to that activity which produces our own personal development, *i. e., will.* For it is volition which maintains the unity of our experience while at the same time continually introducing new objects into it. The activity of will is therefore the very principle of genesis itself, the essence of real development, showing us the ideal possibilities of the future, thus converting the ideal into actuality. It is consequently able as no other form of human experience to interpret the nature of reality, not as being, but as becoming, as that which is achieving organization, is winning unity.

Cognition, Beauty, and Goodness: H. M. KALLEN.

Private, concrete, elusive, in itself neither mental nor amental, beauty is the optional mode of that positive, intrinsic, value-relation which binds the mind to its object in such wise that the two are completely and harmoniously adapted to each other in the very act of apprehension.

German Pragmatism: G. JACOBY.

In opposition to Professor James's formula: "Germany lags behind in pragmatism," we propose that "America lags behind Germany." American pragmatism is the reaction of a biological type

of philosophy against the rationalistic idealism of the so-called "Hegelian" school of this country. Forty years ago a similar biological philosophy in Germany reacted against the true Hegelian school of Hegel himself. From this anti-Hegelian movement derives the well-known German pragmatism of Ernest Mach, Wilhelm Jerusalem, George Simmel, Richard Avenarius, Wilhelm Ostwald, and Hans Vaihinger, whose recently published standard work on "Die Philosophie des Als Ob" was written in 1816–1818. If American pragmatism meets at present with disapproval in Germany this is due to the fact, that just at the time when anti-Hegelian pragmatism became popular in this country, Germany had become tired of it and had just entered a new counter-reaction, the so-called "revival of philosophy." The German revivalists reject pragmatism as a kind of utilitarianism. But this is a misunderstanding. It appears that pragmatism is the best, if not the only method, by which the tendencies of the new German movement can be worked out satisfactorily.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Analyse et Critique des Principes de la Psychologie de W. James. A. MÉNARD. Paris: Felix Alcan. 1911. Pp. 466.

"*Une étude de ce genre,*" M. Ménard writes in his preface, "*destinée tout particulièrement à exposer l'essentiel d'un ouvrage important peu ou mal connu comportait des citations où le lecteur pût retrouver l'auteur, malgré le commentateur. On excusera, pour cela même, nôtre loyalisme d'en avoir abusé.*" This sentiment is the key to the book. But M. Ménard is too modest. His analysis is desirable not only for the French public; it performs a needful and a high service also for all readers to whom the psychological work of William James is of interest—readers American or English or continental. Nor is there need to deprecate the "loyalty" of quotation, or to excuse such divergences between author and commentator as arise in the book. M. Ménard's criticisms are those of a reflective interpreter, not of a hostile judge. What he says comes rather by way of supplementation and complement, than by way of contradiction or disputatious abstraction.

Of the many excellences of this summary, not the least seems to me to be the effectiveness with which it exhibits the inward consistency and articulation of James's psychological method. To the incidental reader and even to the student who approaches the "Principles" with the bias and preconceptions of the barren psychology of the laboratory, a psychology dominated largely by the Wundtian influence, much in the master's

great book seems discontinuous, unreflectively empirical, contradictory. M. Ménard shows how superficial such an impression is. The eight chapters, in which James's principles of psychology are expounded reveal an architectonic that is not merely the expression of the deductive habits of the French mind, which will set its world in order whether or no; it is much more the natural articulation of James's conclusions on psychology, now treated as objects to be exhibited, where in the text they are principles to be discovered.

It is needless, for readers of the JOURNAL, to restate these principles or their review by M. Ménard. He throws them, however, into relief by flanking them, with respect to method, by the views of Wundt, and with respect to content, by those of Bergson. In M. Ménard's opinion they shine by the contrast as well as by their inward light, and this is not an opinion with which I am ready to disagree, though, I do not doubt, others may and will.

The contrast in method depends on and derives from the contrast in content. From the standpoint of radical empiricism, mental states are continuous and genuinely indivisible. Consciousness is a stream; no state of it can be "compounded." Mental facts, hence, can not undergo analysis from within, and the method of psychology will, in consequence, involve no more than the description of such states and their coordination with their physiological correspondents. These latter, indeed, the ground and condition of mental states, are susceptible of determination with respect to their components, if they have such, but no state of consciousness can be deduced or compounded from simpler mental elements. Thus there should be a radical difference between the method of psychology and that of the physical sciences. Wundt, however, denies the necessity of such a difference. Believing that there is no means of knowing, other than the analysis of a whole into its elements, he maintains that psychological knowledge must consist of just such analysis, *i. e.*, "if we succeed, in psychology, under the same given and measurable conditions, in causing a certain complex to vary in a constant manner, we should be able to conclude that this complex *contains* a constant element which is one of its *constituents.*" On the basis of such variations Wundt finds two elementary psychological categories—pure sensations and simple feelings. James, starting empirically with content, argues to a method determined by that content: Wundt, starting *a priori* with a method, argues to a content that alone such a method can adequately handle.

Both procedures and conclusions are practically antithetical. For James, consciousness is nothing so much as a *stream* in which identical and changeless elements can not be found; least of all, elements. For Wundt, consciousness is a comparatively stable composition, and its transitive and elusory aspects are negligible. Can there, then, be no compromise between the procedure of James and that of Wundt, no genuinely solid psychological knowledge? Not so, thinks M. Ménard. James's own work is such a compromise. If mind is a stream, its bed, the nervous system, is compared with it, not a stream. The action of the nervous system is the resultant of the interaction of its elements—a physical thing susceptible

to just that experimentation which Wundt desiderates. Thus, on the side of the mind, we get purely empirical description; on the side of the body, *scientific* analysis of conditions coordinate with the states subject to this description. Laboratory psychology, hence, is both possible and desirable. But its business is not the disintegration of an undisintegrable stream of thought; its business is the coordination of the qualities of that stream with the exact conditions under which they appear.

As for Bergson, M. Ménard finds much in common between him and James. Both are agreed as to the inadequacy of the analytic method of approach to a knowledge of the mind. There is an intimate analogy between James's "radical empiricism" and Bergsonian intuitionism. The latter's conception of pure perception is practically identical with James's pure sensation, while his doctrine of the sensori-motor function of the brain, of the selective character of its activities, though they derive from different motives (not, in M. Ménard's opinion, opposed to each other) are analogous to the Jamesian teaching on the same subject. It is when one passes beyond the function of the nervous system and the abstraction of "pure sensation" to the problem of perception that differences are perceived. These differences are radical. They involve the questions of memory, recognition, and attention, and with respect to none of them are Bergson's answers satisfactory. These answers turn on his division of memory into "pure" and "motor," a division not founded, M. Ménard thinks, on introspection, and presupposing an unverifiable subconscious and inert mentality, that becomes, in perception, recognition and attention, conscious by some *vis occulta.* James's interpretation of the phenomena of memory in sensori-motor terms is simpler and more elegant, and by use of association by contiguity, serves equally well to account for "recognition" and the "feelings of familiarity"; and for attention by means of "accommodation" and "preperception." Although M. Ménard doubts whether James's distinction between "accommodation" and "preperception" is not a distinction without a difference, he holds that this doubt abates in no way the superior adequacy of the Jamesian account of memory, recognition, and attention. Nor is the latter account of will less superior to Wundt's hypothesis of a particular feeling of innervation for which there is neither logical necessity nor empirical evidence, direct or indirect, since all that is needful is the underlying theory of the sensori-motor function of the brain. In the light of this theory, James finds the will to be at most the deployment of the motricity of ideas, all of which are to him, in varying degrees, motor. But it does not follow from this intimacy between ideas and bodily action that the difference between mind and matter (which is felt through action) is reduced thereby. William James's assumption of the attitude of the populace toward mind and body—naïve and irreducible dualism—is the only assumption that comports with scientific psychology. And herein again James excels both Wundt and Bergson.

It will be seen that there are here many possible points of difference with respect to interpretation. I do not propose to take these up. Interpretation is a matter of temperamental, not of logical, necessity. I can

not refrain the remark, however, that it is something of a pity that M. Ménard has found it necessary to confine himself to the "Principles" and has not followed the development of the master's thinking on psychological problems to its latest expressions. He notes, for example, but does not use, the chapter on the "Compounding of Consciousness" in "A Pluralistic Universe." Yet this has a profoundly important bearing on one of the positions taken in the "Principles." Then, there is the essay on the "Energies of Men," and still others. However, within the limits of his book M. Ménard has performed a service for which lovers of William James and of the science of psychology may well be grateful.

HORACE M. KALLEN.

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Justice and Happiness. W. BENETT. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1911. Pp. 140.

Readers of Mr. Benett's "Ethical Aspects of Evolution," published several years ago, will be somewhat disappointed, at least in the form of the two essays, "Justice" and "Happiness," which are brought together in this more recent volume. The author shows himself, on the whole, the same close and independent thinker; he is often suggestively original as well as independent; but he seems here too much the abstract thinker. The essays are so much more of the concept-without-percept type than the earlier work. Not that he offers no illustrations, but such illustrations as he gives do not belong so convincingly to the natural scenery of thought. Again, the two essays are more than merely the two essays which they appear to be, since in point of fact the author has only one subject, namely, the relation of justice to happiness, and for his failure more openly and more completely to organize his material to this one end he should be criticized—at least with a gentle reproof! Still, although in both of the ways now indicated he has failed to make thought and fact, form and matter meet in a wholly successful harmony, nevertheless any critic must feel apologetic, for Mr. Benett has certainly made an interesting contribution to the subject—or subjects?—upon which he has written.

To give a very brief and inadequate statement of his contentions, the primary interest of men in justice is not acquisition or maintenance of happiness, but security for freedom. Primarily, justice makes men free—free to live, free to realize themselves, free in a "forward evolution." Thus justice is either retributive or distributive, and in either case is determined under two principles, one of personal equality, the other of desert or "equality of value." In retributive justice there is no conflict of these principles, rewards and punishments being governed entirely by desert, the position of men before the law, by personal equality; but in distributive justice there is and always must be conflict, for here, *e. g.*, in the distribution of property and social status, desert (especially after modification by historic development) and personal equality "are contradictory and can not be realized concurrently or by the same laws." Accordingly distributive justice is always a compromise between equality of persons and equality of deserts or perhaps (again remembering how the

original principal of equality of desert has been obscured by history) "between personal equality and personal inequality";[1] or say, further, between dispersion and accumulation of property, between socialism and individualism, in taxation between a poll tax and a graduated property tax. And, being such a compromise, "true justice, if established, will never be regarded as just by the adherents of either side" and, "because in a state of evolution the conditions on both sides are always shifting, both terms must be continually under revision" (p. 57). Justice, in other words, is ever a sort of restless balancing, an unstable equilibrium of opposites and herein one hears again the persistent theme of the author's *Ethical Aspects of Evolution,* to quote now the rest of his title, "viewed as the parallel development of Opposites." But, justice being such a mean or poise, being unjust if given to either side in excess, and any deviation from its character of a mean, as in either insufficient or excessive respect for property, bringing the dangers of degeneration, of extreme stability, which is a bar to progress, of deterioration of moral character, and of one form and another of despotism, there is the "plain inference that what we have to thank justice for is that it protects us from those dangers and secures our freedom and our uninterrupted progress along the path of evolution" (p. 70). As for happiness, it can not be primarily the motive of man's interest in justice, for justice, as has been shown, both implies and seeks life, progress, conflict, while happiness "is a state of peace or harmony from which the feeling of conation is as completely as possible excluded" and "its value depends entirely on the conduct which it accompanies" (p. 124). "To pursue happiness must be the same thing as to avoid conflict" and this "is the same thing as to renounce duty." In short "the pursuit of happiness as a direct end empties happiness of value, and the only prizes it offers are apples of the Dead Sea" (p. 125). Happiness, then, can no more be the motive of justice than peace is the motive of war. "Peace may be had, without war and without honor, by submission. When men go to war it is for freedom, and the love of freedom is a higher form of the love of life. Rather than lose that they would forego peace and live in perpetual warfare. And they would forego not only peace, but happiness also" (p. 121).

Such are Mr. Benett's contentions and let me hope that by my attempts to state them clearly and fairly I have both tempered my introductory criticisms and justified my statement that he has made an interesting contribution to his subject.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. January, 1912. *Contribution to the History of the Concept of Reality* (pp. 1–10): OSWALD KUELPE.– By the concept of reality is meant "those objects whose determination is

[1] *Vide* whole of author's excellent summary, pp. 40–41.

arrived at by the several empirical sciences and their supplementary metaphysics, . . . and the fact becomes clear that in these cases there is something postulated, whose being and becoming are quite independent of all thinking and cognizing." An examination of the concept of reality throughout the course of philosophy shows that reality is postulated and determined. *The Problem of Time in Recent French Philosophy. I. Renouvier and Recent Temporalism* (pp. 11–31): ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY. – The beginning of a series of papers on the history of temporalism, the series to consider Renouvier, Bergson, Pillon, and James. The work of Renouvier is here reviewed. *Nietzsche and Democracy* (pp. 32–50): A. K. ROGERS. – An exposition and criticism of the three main features of Nietzsche's philosophy, namely, the appeal to nature, the rejection of the social and sympathetic virtues, and the attempted alliance with the scientific dogma of natural selection. *The Consistency of Idealism with Realism* (pp. 51–68): W. H. SHELDON. – "Realists then have been right in asserting the reality of abstracted unreduced facts, wrong in denying that they may also be reduced to terms of mind. Idealists have been right in asserting the finality of that reduction, wrong in denying the equal finality of the abstract." *Discussion* (pp. 69–81): *A Reply to Professor Royce's Critique of Instrumentalism:* JOHN DEWEY. *Reviews of Books* (pp. 82–97). Hastings Rashdall, *Philosophy and Religion:* H. W. STUART. Alfred Walth Whitehead and Bertrand Russel, *Principia Mathematica:* MORRIS R. COHEN. Simon Deploige, *Le Conflict de la Morale et de la Sociologie:* WARNER FITE. A. E. Taylor, *Varia Socratica:* G. S. BRETT. *Notices of New Books. Summaries of Articles. Notes.*

ARCHIV FÜR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE. Band 25, Heft 2. January, 1912. *Wilhelm Dilthey* (pp. 143–153): A. TUMARKIN. – A tribute. *Im Druck erscheinene Schriften von Wilhelm Dilthey* (pp. 154–161): H. Zeeck. – 111 of Dilthey's more important books and articles published between 1859 and 1911. *Platon's Gesetze und die sizilische Reform* (pp. 162–174): J. O. EBERZ. – The Philebus, the Statesman, and the Timæus were succeeded by the Laws in Plato's final attempt to unite the Sicilian towns in a reformed state, with the cooperation of Dion and the Pythagoreans. *Aristophanischer und geschichtlicher Sokrates* (pp. 175–195): H. RÖCK. – I. An examination of previous trials for sacrilege preparatory to contesting Zeller's position that Socrates's execution was a judicial murder. *Die Anamnesis. Ein Beitrag zum Platonismus* (pp. 196–225): E. MULLER. – From a study of ten of Plato's dialogues it is made clear how essential his doctrine of *anamnesis* is to an understanding of his theory of knowledge, and of mental faculty. *Einige wichtigere Erscheinungen der deutschen Literatur über die Sokratische, Platonische und Aristotelische Philosophie* 1905–1906 (pp. 226–236): H. GOMPERZ. – A critical but very appreciative review of A. Döring's *Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie,* and a combative study of R. Pohlmann's *Sokratische Studien,* to be continued. *Rezensionen* (pp. 237–245): M. Wundt, *Griechische Weltanschauung:* R. PHILLPPSON. H. H. Bockwitz, *Jean Jacques Gourds Philosophisches System:* B. JORDAN. G. Falter,

Staatsideale unserer Klassiker: B. JORDAN. *Die neuesten Erscheinungen. Historische Abhandlungen. Eingegangene Werke.*

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. February, 1912. *La substitution psychique* (pp. 113–139): E. PAULHAN. – A study, in pathological and periodic variations, of consciousness in three phases of substitution; when an element is suppressed in a preexisting system leaving a gap, when a new element comes to replace one that has temporarily or permanently disappeared, and when a new element is accommodated to the old and the old to a new. *De la valeur pratique d'une morale fondée sur la science* (pp. 140–166): J.-M. LAHY. – Ethics must draw its ideals from the contributions of science and the certainty of a scientific ethics gives a mental calm and enthusiasm that the old ethics could never attain. *Les grands courants de esthétique allemande contemporaine* (2e et dernier article) (pp. 167–190): V. BASCH. – An exposition of Lipps's position, and the "science of art" of Semper, Grosse, Wundt, Schmarsow. *Analyses et comptes rendus.* Lash, *Die Logic der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre:* A. L. *Les méthodes juridiques* (Leçons). A. Levy, *La société et l'ordre juridique:* G. RICHARD. Cornejo, *Sociologie générale:* DR. S. JANKELEVITCH. J. Van Biervliet, *Premiers éléments de pédagogie expérimentale:* L. DUGAS. A. de Fleuriau, *L'Activité réfléchie:* J. DAGNAN-BOUVERET. Werner Klette, *Über Theorien und Probleme der Buhnenillusion:* L. ARRÉAT. Berthelot, *Un romanticisme utilitaire:* FR. P. Broder Christiansen, *Kritik der Kantischen Erkenntnislehre:* J. SEGOND. J. Burnet, *Plato's Phædo:* C. HUIT. *Revue des périodiques étrangers.*

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NOTES AND NEWS

AT the meeting of the Aristotelian Society on May 6, Miss Beatrice Edgell read a paper on "Imagery and Memory." "In examining the orders of fact which it is necessary for psychological analysis to recognize in its attempt to deal with memory as a cognitive state of consciousness,

we may, following Bergson, distinguish retention, the memory which repeats, the memory of habit and practise, from the memory which imagines, memory proper. The differing forms of the latter—recognition, persistence, reminiscence, suggested recall, and recollection—manifest with varying degrees of distinctness three orders of fact: an act, reference back to the past, imagery and meaning or object remembered. Imagery is treated as the product of the reference back, the form in which consciousness responds to a given situation. It is "presentation," distinguishable from the act of remembering on the one hand, and from the meaning or what is remembered on the other. Unless "presentation" be so recognized, there is no justification for regarding a cognitive state of consciousness as generically different from other forms of conscious experience. All consciousness would then be reducible to one supreme category—conation. A sketch plan of such a merely conative psychology has been worked out by Professor Alexander. But the attempt to eliminate 'presentation' leads to insuperable difficulties. When imagery is treated as object and non-mental, the 'pastness' of what is remembered becomes unintelligible, while the memory of the subject's own past states of consciousness is *ex hypothesi* impossible, for such past states can not be non-mental objects. Memory in this case has to be translated into 'revival' or 'renewal,' but such a translation proves upon examination inadequate to the fact as consciously experienced."—*The Athenæum.*

J. CARLETON BELL, Ph.D. (Harvard), managing editor of the *Journal of Educational Psychology* and director of the psychological laboratory in the Brooklyn Training School for Teachers, has been appointed professor of the art of teaching in the University of Texas. Dr. Bell will devote his attention chiefly to the experimental investigation of problems of teaching.

STEPHEN S. COLVIN, Ph.B. (Brown, '91), Ph.D. (Strasburg, '97), professor of psychology in the University of Illinois, has accepted a chair in educational psychology in Brown University, newly established in cooperation with the State Board of Education with the assistance of an appropriation made by the state legislature.—*Science.*

PROFESSOR HUGO MÜNSTERBERG, who has now sailed for Europe, gave an address on June 4 before the Naval War College in Newport, R. I., on "The Psychology of the Navy," and an address on June 5 before the American Association for Labor Legislation on "The Psychology of Industrial Efficiency."—*Science.*

THE fourth annual meeting of the Minnesota Psychological Conference was held at the University of Minnesota on March 29. The morning session was devoted to a discussion of the Treatment and Diagnosis of Exceptional Children.

PROFESSOR G. M. WHIPPLE, of Cornell University, has been granted a half year's leave of absence. He will make a study of the recent developments in applied and educational psychology in various educational centers of Europe.